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Equal Justice Under Law: The Jurisprudential
Legacy of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.'
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness.'
How long? Not long. Because the arm of the moral universe is long
but it bends toward justice.2
If we abdicate responsibility to address the difficult questions of
our time, those in need of refuge from the torrents of political,
economic, and religious forces will find no haven in the law and the
law will no longer be supreme.... A judge must always be
consumed by a passion for justice which propels judgment toward
the just conclusion.3
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.'s judicial career is a profile in courage.
From 1955 until his retirement from the bench in 1996, Judge Johnson
unfailingly worked to make the abstract language of the Constitution a
meaningful reality. In the process, he helped to reshape and renew both his
native South and the nation as a whole. For Judge Johnson, "[t]he true
strength of the Constitution l[ay] in its flexibility, its ability to change, to
grow, and to respond to the special needs and demands of our society at a
' Visiting Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Law Clerk to
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., 1991-1992. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of John C.
Hueston, one of my co-clerks, and Nancy M. Olson, another law clerk to Judge Johnson. in
preparing this Tribute.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Our God Is Marching On!. in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 119, 124 (James Melvin Washington ed.. 1992); see
also Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (providing the injunction that
facilitated the Selma-to-Montgomery march, a march that culminated with Dr. King's delivery of
Our God Is Marching On!1 on the steps of the Alabama state capitol).
3. Judge Frank M. Johnson, Reflections on the Judicial Career of Robert S. Vance, 42 ALA.
L. REV. 964, 968, 970 (1991).
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particular time."4 His career was a testament to this vision of the
Constitution as a dynamic shield against injustice.
As I was growing up in Moss Point, Mississippi, a small town on the
Mississippi Gulf Coast, I was blissfully unaware of the ways in which
federal judges like Frank Johnson had transformed the institutions that
served as the setting for my most basic formative experiences. The public
schools in Moss Point were desegregated in the early 1970s, with the active
assistance of the National Guard, just a few years before I began grade
school. Although I had no appreciation of it at the time, I enjoyed the
considerable benefits associated with a fully integrated learning
environment only because of the unfailing dedication and considerable
personal courage of the federal judges who worked to make the rights set
forth in Brown v. Board of Education5 something more than mere legal
abstractions. From the public library, to the public parks, to the recreational
department, the fact of integration in my home town-and indeed
throughout my home state-was, for the most part, a function of
determined effort on the part of African-American citizens, their white
allies, and the federal courts.
At the heart of the civil rights movement was a commitment to force
the United States to live up to the grand words in the Declaration of
Independence, words notably absent from the Constitution of 1787. The
Constitution, of course, was at its inception and remains today a work in
progress. During the celebrations associated with the Constitution's
bicentennial in 1987, more than a few commentators emphasized that the
Framers' document did a poor job of implementing the "self-evident"
truth, proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, that "all men are
created equal." As Justice Thurgood Marshall wryly put it, "Well, if you're
gonna do what they did two hundred years ago, somebody's going to give
me short pants and a tray so I can serve coffee." 
6
Following a long and bloody civil war, the American people amended
the Constitution to remedy the defects visited upon the republic by the
Framers' inability to realize the full promise of the Declaration of
Independence. For a time, the guarantees of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments took on a meaningful reality under the program of
congressional Reconstruction.7 In 1876, in order to secure the election of
4. Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary with Respect to the Other Branches
of Government, 11 GA. L. REV. 455, 468 (1977).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD O JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL 390 (1993); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Letting the Law Catch Up, 44
STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1992) (recounting Justice Marshall's offer to appear at Chief Justice
Warren's proposed reenactment of the signing of the Declaration of Independence in livery and
kneebritches, carrying trays).
7. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1961).
1238 [Vol. 109: 1237
Krotoszynski
Rutherford B. Hayes to the Presidency, the Republican Party abandoned its
efforts to dismantle apartheid in the states of the former Confederacy.!
From 1876 to 1954, the amended Constitution's promise of equality largely
went unkept. When the project of achieving racial justice in the United
States resumed in the middle of the twentieth century, it fell to the federal
judiciary to give meaning to the unfulfilled promises of an earlier
generation. On the front lines of the federal judiciary at the district court
level, and in Alabama particularly, the task of making public institutions
reflect "self-evident" truths fell upon the broad shoulders of Judge Frank
M. Johnson, Jr.
Almost half a century after the Montgomery bus boycott and the other
seminal events of the civil rights era, it is all too easy to forget that the
progress toward racial equality has not been solely-or even
predominantly-a product of the democratic process, particularly at the
state or local level. Rather, the transformation of local and state
governments in the South required massive federal judicial intervention.
The story of the civil rights movement is very much a story about
repeatedly testing the limits of law as an agent of transformative social
change, with federal judges playing an integral role in this process.'
To be sure, judicial intervention alone could not have accomplished the
task at hand; federal legislative reforms, culminating in the passage and
enforcement of the landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965, provided a
structural framework for the movement.'" The long journey from apartheid
to equality required many heroes, large and small, to assume great burdens
in the effort to achieve racial justice.
The campaign to enforce the rule of law in the South benefited
tremendously from the professional efforts of Judge Johnson. At terrific
cost to himself and his family, he resolutely enforced the Constitution's
requirements against recalcitrant state and local governments bent on
maintaining a racist status quo. As a district court judge, his rulings were
not only trailblazing in the area of civil rights, but often marked the
incendiary first contact by state and local officials with the post-Brown
federal judiciary. No one can gainsay his courage in the face of sustained
and premeditated opposition from many corners of the community, most
notably the Governor's office.
Given the prevailing views of the majority community during the 1950s
8. See id. at 218-27.
9. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Building Bridges and Overcoming Barricades: Erploring
the Limits of Law as an Agent of Transformational Social Change. 47 CASE W. RES. L REV. 423,
427-32 (1997).
10. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selna: The Importance of Context in Public
Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L. 1411, 1412, 1427-28 (1995).
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and 1960s, Judge Johnson's commitment to enforcing the concept of equal
protection of the laws made him a remarkably unpopular jurist. Cronies of
Governor George C. Wallace regularly inveighed against Judge Johnson,
publicly urging "responsible Dixie citizens to blacklist federal judges, their
families, and their friends."" Federal judges like Frank Johnson, bent on
holding Alabama constitutionally accountable, "should be scorned, they
and their families ostracized by responsible Southerners." 2 Perhaps most
famously, Governor Wallace once publicly fulminated against Judge
Johnson as an "'integrating, scalawagging, carpet-bagging, race-mixing,
bald-faced liar' who 'hasn't ever done anything for Alabama except to help
destroy it."' "3
The political community's efforts to ostracize and vilify him did not
dissuade the Judge from doing his duty. Through this storm of hate and
personal invective,' 4 Judge Johnson bravely soldiered on, doing his duty as
an Article IH judge to enforce the mandates of the U.S. Constitution. As he
explained, "[I]t's just hard to ostracize people when social status is not very
important to them." 5
But Judge Johnson's legacy is not only one of personal bravery, or
commitment to duty: He possessed not only a brave heart; he also possessed
a wise heart and a sharp legal mind. Throughout his tenure on the bench, his
11. ROBERT FRANCIS KENNEDY, JR., JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 178
(1978) (quoting Seymore Trammell, former prosecutor in Barbour County and Bullock County,
Alabama).
12. Id. (quoting Trammell).
13. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA 87
(1981).
14. Throughout his political career, Wallace attacked Judge Johnson and attempted to inflame
public sentiment against him, both personally and professionally, and against federal authority in
general. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M.
JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 184-259 (1993); YARBROUGH,
supra note 13, at 87, 95, 119-20, 202; see also BASS, supra, at 194-95 (recounting gubernatorial
candidate Wallace's use of personal invective against Judge Johnson as a stock element in his
stump speech). On another occasion Wallace opined that Judge Johnson was in need of "a barbed-
wire enema," a comment that Wallace later came to regret. YARBROUGH, supra note 13, at 202;
see also BASS, supra, at 3, 266, 339-40, 353 (recounting Governor Wallace's repeated use of the
"barbed-wire enema" hyperbole, the national media's reaction to Wallace's "true gutter style,"
and Wallace's subsequent apology for his language during a 60 Minutes interview).
15. BASS, supra note 14, at 128 (quoting Judge Johnson). Judge Johnson consistently
preferred the solitude of "fishing for speckled trout and chewing tobacco and maybe drinking a
beer" to "being at the Phantom Ball." Id at 129. Nonetheless, the effect of unceasing public
heckling by Governor Wallace and comprehensive social ostracism inevitably took its toll both on
the Judge and his family. See id. at 112-13, 124-25, 216, 320-21; FRANK SIKORA, THE JUDGE:
THE LIFE & OPINIONS OF ALABAMA'S FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. 94 (1992). The verbal attacks
directed at the Judge's son, and the Klan's bombing of his mother's house, went well beyond what
any person in public life might reasonably expect as an incident of holding public office. See
BASS, supra note 14, at 125-26, 216 (describing the Klan's bombing of Judge Johnson's mother's
house and Governor Wallace's public attacks on Judge Johnson's son, Johnny).
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opinions embodied the maxim fiat justitia, ruat caeculum: "Let right be
done, though the heavens should fall." 6
From the perspective of many white Alabamians, the heavens fell in
Judge Frank Johnson's courtroom. In a series of pathbreaking decisions,
Judge Johnson set about dismantling the system of de jure segregation that
affected almost every aspect of community life, from the public schools, to
the public libraries, to the parks, to the museums, to the bus station, to the
state highway patrol.
Indeed, the Judge spent his professional life pushing, pulling, and
sometimes forcing government to honor its commitment to equal justice."
As he put it, " IThe Constitution guarantees each citizen full and equal
membership in society." 18 For Judge Johnson, "[t]he hallmark of any
society that claims to be civilized has to be its ability to do justice-to
apply rules with equal favor to both the privileged and the downtrodden." '
To achieve justice, a judge must "consistently protecto the law from the
passions of the moment, from politics, from partisanship, from prejudices,
from personal, local, or sectional interests and unethical influences."'
Judge Johnson's judicial opinions reflect an unwavering commitment to
equality, to fundamental fairness, and to the equal dignity of all persons
under law.
Beginning in 1956, in Browder v. Gayle,2' Judge Johnson vindicated
the notion that the law recognizes no differences in citizenship based on
race. As he told his first law clerk after casting his decisive vote in
Browder, "Well, we got up on this horse, now we got to ride him." ' He
continued to enforce the concept of equal protection of the law in a line of
cases following Browder, and in the process desegregated virtually every
public institution in Alabama.
Judge Johnson's concept of the equal dignity of all persons was not
limited to questions of race. He brought the same scrutiny to bear on
16. As one of Judge Johnson's colleagues observed, -Judge Johnson's revolutionary
willingness to take constitutional mandates to their logical conclusions is inspirational to any
judge who may be facing an unconstitutional and difficult status quo." Judge Sam D. Johnson,
Foreword to Fifth Circuit Survey: June 1994-May 1995, 27 TEX. TECH. L REV. 423, 426-27
(1996).
17. For a list of Judge Johnson's major desegregation decisions, see Frank M. Johnson. The
Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEX. L. REV. 903,905-06 (1976).
18. Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Remarks at the Dedication Ceremony, Frank M. Johnson, Jr.
Federal Building and United States Courthouse (May 22, 1992). in 989 F.2d LXXXIX. CXI.
19. Id. at CX.
20. Id. at CX-CXI.
21. 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) (striking down an Alabama statute and a Montgomery,
Alabama, city ordinance requiring racial segregation on public transportation, including
Montgomery's municipal buses), afd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). Browder represented the
legal culmination of the Montgomery bus boycott, a massive social protest effort initiated by Rosa
Parks and subsequently led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
22. Charles R McManis, Introduction to Johnson, supra note 4. at 456.
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classifications that imposed burdens on the basis of gender. In cases like
Frontiero v. Laird23 and White v. Crook,24 he required that the government
refrain from imposing special burdens on women solely on account of their
gender. In this respect, he was ahead of his time. Although the Supreme
Court has come to demand "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for
gender-based classifications only in the last decade, 5 Judge Johnson
viewed such government classifications with great skepticism some thirty
years ago.
Judge Johnson also recognized the essential dignity of prisoners and
those suffering from mental illness, persons all too often ignored, forgotten,
or despised by the general society, persons to whom the political process in
Alabama routinely turned a blind eye. In Wyatt v. Stickney, 6 he required the
State of Alabama to improve the conditions of those involuntarily
committed to the state's mental hospitals. Conditions in these hospitals
were unspeakable, with patients living in filth and dying of dehydration.27
Similarly, in Pugh v. Locke, Judge Johnson required the state to observe
23. 341 F. Supp. 201, 209-11 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"administrative convenience" could not justify a rule imposing gender-based burden by requiring
a female military employee to prove her husband's dependence on her income while imposing no
equivalent burden on a male military employee to demonstrate his wife's dependence on his
income), rev'd sub nom. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
24. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (prohibiting Alabama officials from refusing to seat
racial minorities or women on juries in the state courts); cf Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60-65
(1961) (upholding Florida's automatic exemption of women from state-court juries as an
appropriate gender-inspired "privilege"). Alabama law affirmatively restricted jury service to
male citizens and, in practice, to white male citizens. See White, 251 F. Supp. at 405-08 & n. 14.
25. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).
26. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). To this day, this class action remains under the continuing jurisdiction of the court. As
Stephen Bright has explained, "So great was Alabama's resistance to properly treating its
mentally ill, that the litigation has continued for over twenty-six years and has produced at least
thirty-nine reported decisions." Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the
South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817, 837 (1998).
27. This is no overstatement:
There were severe health and safety problems: Patients with open wounds and
inadequately treated skin diseases were in imminent danger of infection because of the
unsanitary conditions existing in the wards, such as permitting urine and feces to
remain on the floor; there was evidence of insect infestation in the kitchen and dining
areas.... Aides frequently put patients in seclusion or under physical restraints.
including straitjackets, without physicians' orders. One resident had been regularly
confined in a straightjacket for more than nine years.... The patients suffered brutality,
both at the hands of the aides and at the hands of their fellow patients; testimony
established that four Partlow residents died due to understaffing, lack of supervision,
and brutality.
Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1310-11.
28. 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). For a
history of this litigation and its mixed legacy, see LARRY W. YACKLE, REFORM AND REGRET:
THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989).
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constitutionally mandated minimum standards of care for the state's prison
population. The shocking conditions in Alabama's state prisons included
"lack of sanitation ... in living areas, infirmaries, and food service," and
"unguarded, overcrowded dormitories, with no realistic attempt by officials
to separate violent, aggressive inmates from those who are passive or
weak"29 and led to "rampant violence." 30
It is all too easy to ignore or dismiss claims brought on behalf of those
at the margins of society. Judge Johnson easily could have avoided
undertaking the hard task of remedying the deplorable conditions in the
state's mental hospitals and prisons. He could have employed any number
of the so-called "passive virtues" to escape the controversy associated with
holding the state accountable for the fashion in which it was treating its
least powerful citizens.3" Judge Johnson did not shirk his constitutional
duty; rather, as he had always done before, he embraced it and faced the
firestorm that inevitably followed.
As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison, "The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."3"
Quoting Blackstone, Chief Justice Marshall opined that "it is a general and
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy," and that "every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress." 33 For Marshall, the availability of an
effective remedy for a violation of a right was the very essence of the rule
of law; a government ceases to be "a government of laws, and not of men"
when "the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
29. Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 329.
30. Id. at 325. As Judge Johnson explained.
[Tihe wardens of these facilities, because of the inconvenicnce and because they are not
trained to screen medical complaints, many times refuse to provide needed medical
attention .... There is a chronic shortage of medical supplies throughout the
system. ... Rags have been used as a substitute for gauze sponges, out-of-date drugs
have been administered, and oxygen tanks in a prison ambulance have remained empty
and unusable .... Medical personnel are continually called upon to perform services
for which they have not been trained and for which they are not
qualified.... Unsupervised prisoners, without formal training, regularly pull teeth.
screen sick call patients, dispense as well as administer medication, including
dangerous drugs, give injections, take X-rays, suture, and perform minor surgery.
Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 283 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th
Cir. 1974).
31. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUs BRANCi: THE SUPREIE COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 113-27 (1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 47-58 (1961); cf. Owen M. Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1. 27-28 (1979)
(arguing that courts have an obligation to provide effective remedies for proven constitutional
wrongs in order to "remove the condition that threatens ... constitutional values").
32. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
33. Id. at 163.
20001 1243
The Yale Law Journal
right." ' Judge Johnson's consistent refusal to deny plaintiffs a meaningful
remedy for proven constitutional wrongs at the hands of the state both
reflects and embodies these principles. As he once put the matter: "Faced
with defaults by government officials ... a judge does not have the option
of declaring that litigants have rights without remedies." 3 5
Judge Johnson brought a practical wisdom to his decisions, creatively
fashioning relief equal to the task at hand. Often this required him to
abandon more traditional forms of prohibitory injunctive relief in favor of
more specific, affirmative injunctive commands. As he once explained,
"[I]f we, as judges, have learned anything from Brown v. Board of
Education, it is that prohibitory relief alone affords but hollow protection
from continuing abuse by recalcitrant governments." 36 Judge Johnson's
creative use of injunctions led some to level the charge of "judicial
activism" against him; he responded that "[t]he courts possess only so
much power as the other branches relinquish" by failing to observe
constitutional obligations.37
Judge Johnson's passion for justice led him to embrace highly creative
solutions to difficult legal problems. When faced with entrenched
opposition by local voting registrars to the registration of African-American
citizens, he helped to pioneer the use of the "freezing principle," by which
racial minorities seeking to become registered voters had to be enrolled
under the same standards and procedures used previously to enroll white
voters.38 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subsequently
adopted this standard for use in other voting rights cases involving racial
34. Id.
35. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA.
L. REV. 271, 274 (1981); see also OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 9-12, 36-37,
86-95 (1978) (defending the use of structural injunctions when necessary to eradicate
unconstitutional conditions in state-operated institutions, even when such injunctions displace
local control in favor of federal judicial supervision).
36. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901, 910 (1979);
see also United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 682 (M.D. Ala. 1961) ("The evidence in
this case is so abundantly clear in portraying the discriminatory acts and practices, which acts and
practices clearly violate the Constitution and laws of the United States, that this Court is of the
firm opinion that this case warrants not only a prohibitory decree but a decree mandatory in
nature."), affd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962).
37. Johnson, supra note 36, at 912.
38. See United States v. Penton, 212 F. Supp. 193, 201 (M.D. Ala. 1962) (ordering local
voting registrars "[t]o establish the actual 'qualification standards' under which the Board of
Registrars has accepted white applicants in the past and to set forth the rules and standards which
the Board is to follow in determining whether applicants are qualified to register to vote in
Montgomery County, Alabama"). For a description of how local registrars employed race-based
standards for voter registration in order to deny black citizens suffrage, see id. apps. D & E at 209-
14 (providing a transcript of a statement by a voting registrar who admitted to using race-based
standards in evaluating applications and a transcript of a statement by an illiterate nonminority
who had received assistance from the Board and whose application the Board had accepted).
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discrimination in enforcing voting qualifications.39 The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 later also incorporated the "freezing principle."
In Williams v. Wallace,40 Judge Johnson articulated the "proportionality
principle" as a test for balancing requests to use public property for speech
activity against the government's claim that the property should be reserved
for its more regular uses. Williams involved a request for an injunction
authorizing a mass protest march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. In
issuing this injunction, Judge Johnson explained that "the extent of a
group's constitutional right to protest peaceably ... must be ... found and
held to be commensurate with the enormity of the wrongs being protested
and petitioned against.", 4' The result of this injunction is well known-the
Selma-to-Montgomery march energized the civil rights movement and
provided a powerful statement to the nation, ultimately leading to the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.42
Throughout his judicial service, Judge Johnson impartially applied the
grand clauses of the Constitution to protect the weak, the powerless, the
marginalized dissenters within the political community. Jager v. Douglas
County School District43 provides a good example. Nothing is more sacred
to Southern culture than high-school varsity football; nothing is more
traditional than an invocation or prayer prior to the commencement of the
game. Notwithstanding the popularity of the practice and its commonplace
nature, Judge Johnson vindicated the Establishment Clause claim of a lone
dissenter who objected to being required to sit quietly during an invocation
before the start of a high-school varsity football game."
I know from lived experience that Judge Johnson's personal views
about the Establishment Clause were somewhat more ambivalent. During
my clerkship, Judge Johnson swore me in to the State Bar of Georgia. The
paperwork from the bar included a mandatory religious oath and made no
provision for the use of an affirmation in lieu of the oath. Assuming that
Judge Johnson would be troubled by this omission, and eager to
demonstrate my knowledge of the law, I noted with alacrity that if a would-
be notary public could not lawfully be required to take a religious oath
incident to achieving that office,45 surely a member of the bar could not be
required to take such an oath. The Judge's reaction was quite surprising: He
39. See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 768-70 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Atkins, 323 F.2d 733, 743-45 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Lynd. 301 F.2d 818. 823 (5th Cir.
1962); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 393-96 (E.D. La. 1963) (thrce-judgc court).
40. 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
41. Id. at 108.
42. See Krotoszynski, supra note 10, at 1425-28.
43. 862 F.2d 824 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
44. See iL at 831-34.
45. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding invalid a Maryland requirement
for a religious oath incident to becoming a notary public).
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stared at me for what seemed like an eternity, and said nothing; finally, he
spoke, asking me, "Do you have a problem with the oath?" I mumbled,
"No, of course not Judge," and wondered how I could have so badly
misjudged the situation. Judge Johnson immediately brightened and said,
"Good, that's good." He then opined that the oath was a mere formality,
that he had taken it or an oath quite like it "four or five times," and that, in
his view, such an oath should offend the sensibilities of only a very few.
Although initially surprised, I later understood that Judge Johnson
correctly had surmised that, in point of fact, I did not have any particularly
compelling personal objection to the oath. Indeed, it was little more than a
kind of debating point to me. On the other hand, I harbor absolutely no
doubts that Judge Johnson would have vindicated an Establishment Clause
challenge brought against the oath by a would-be member of the State Bar
of Georgia who actually maintained a good-faith objection to the oath. In
this way, he possessed an uncanny ability to separate his personal views
from his duties as an Article III judge. Thus, those who assumed, based on
a reading of his opinions, that Judge Johnson was a liberal maverick outside
as well as inside the courtroom were routinely disappointed, for he was
surprisingly traditional, indeed conservative, in his personal life, aesthetics,
and sensibilities. He also viewed the law as being about real consequences
to real people, as opposed to mere abstractions more suitable for a debating
society than for a federal court charged with resolving actual cases and
controversies.46
Judge Johnson's unflinching commitment to equality led him to author
what remains, to many observers, a remarkable opinion in Hardwick v.
Bowers.47 The case involved the arrest of an openly gay man for engaging
in consensual sodomy with another man in his own home, behavior that
violated Georgia's anti-sodomy statute. Hardwick, claiming that Georgia
threatened him with prosecution for this behavior, argued that the Georgia
statute violated his federal constitutional rights.
Judge Johnson began his analysis of the merits by noting that "[tihe
Constitution prevents the States from unduly interfering in certain
individual decisions critical to personal autonomy because those decisions
are essentially private and beyond the legitimate reach of a civilized
society." 48 These rights include the right to conceive and bear a child, the
right to marry, the right to maintain a common household among family
46. In this regard, Judge Johnson routinely reminded his more theoretically minded clerks
that we "don't write for the law reviews." By this, he meant that he wanted his opinions to speak
directly and plainly to the actual dispute between the parties in language that could be understood
by a reasonably intelligent person. Judge Johnson despised opinions that put more emphasis on
style than substance, and was particularly disparaging of colleagues who routinely "overwrote"
opinions, pronouncing such opinions the product of "whoop-de-doos."
47. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
48. Id. at 1211.
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members, and the right to oversee the upbringing of a child. Applying the
line of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,9 Judge Johnson
observed that "[t]he intimate association protected against state interference
does not exist in the marriage relationship alone." Citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird,5' he noted that the Constitution generally prohibits the state from
treating people differently with respect to this right of intimate association,
and explained that "[t]he benefits of marriage can inure to individuals
outside the traditional marital relationship."52 Completing the analogy to
marriage, Judge Johnson concluded that "[ffor some, the sexual activity in
question here serves the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage." "
Essentially, Judge Johnson analogized gay and lesbian relationships to
the marital relationship, noted that physical intimacy could play a largely
identical role in both traditional and nontraditional highly personal
relationships, and required the State of Georgia to demonstrate a
compelling interest before burdening the exercise of the right to intimate
association. Moreover, even if the state could identify a compelling state
interest, it was obliged to show that "this statute is the most narrowly
drawn means of safeguarding that interest." ' This is a classic example of
Judge Johnson's unwavering commitment to the equality principle: Having
identified the right at issue as fundamental-essential to personal happiness
and autonomy-he refused to defer to arbitrary limitations on the exercise
of this right, particularly when the state sought to enforce those limitations
against a disfavored cultural minority.
The Supreme Court, of course, did not see things quite the same way.
In an opinion dripping with sarcasm at the very idea that homosexual
sodomy enjoyed constitutional protection, Justice White summarily
dismissed Hardwick's claim. For Justice White, the right to intimate
association applied only to those in the majority. Chief Justice Burger, in a
particularly unfortunate concurring opinion, invoked the spirit of Leviticus
against Hardwick and others like him."5 Justice White and Chief Justice
Burger failed to recognize the fundamental unfairness of denying a basic
right to an entire class of persons in the absence of a terribly important
reason for doing so. Unlike Judge Johnson, they did not see Hardwick's
claim as a demand for equal treatment, but rather as a demand for special
and unwarranted accommodation for an undeserving cultural minority.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
51. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
53. Id.
54. Id at 1213.
55. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger. Ci.. concurring)
("Condemnation of [homosexual sodomy] is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical
standards.").
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It is always dangerous to predict the future, but in this, as in so many
other instances, I suspect that the verdict of history ultimately will vindicate
both Judge Johnson's understanding of the interests at issue and his analysis
of the state's general ability to regulate private, intimate relationships
between consenting adults.56 As he observed in a different context, "The
Constitution is not an inert and lifeless body of law from which legal
consequences automatically flow. To the contrary, it is dynamic and living,
requiring constant reexamination and reevaluation." 57 Judge Johnson's
opinion in Bowers reflects not only a "dynamic and living" conception of
the Constitution, but also a basic recognition of the equal dignity of all
persons.
Judge Johnson's approach in Bowers also reflects his judicial
pragmatism in construing constitutional text. He consistently rejected any
particular dogma in evaluating constitutional claims, holding that "[a]ny
doctrinal approach to interpreting the Constitution, at whichever extreme, is
both inappropriate and unworkable."5" He was particularly critical of
attempts to define constitutional interpretation in terms of a single
animating objective, emphasizing that "[t]he Framers were pragmatic men
and the Constitution is a practical blueprint."59 For Judge Johnson, the
Constitution's "genius lies in its generality. Perfect logical consistency has
always given way to practical distinction, as well it should."
6
0
It also bears noting that Judge Johnson's personal views about sexual
minorities were somewhat more ambivalent than the sweeping language of
his opinion would suggest. As he told one law clerk, "Bowers was a very
hard decision for me to write." That Judge Johnson did what he perceived
to be his constitutional duty, despite lingering personal doubts about the
morality of nontraditional intimate relationships, is a tribute to his
professionalism and fairness. As the Judge repeatedly emphasized, " [I]t is
one thing for a judge to adopt a theory of political morality because it is his
own; it is another for him to exercise his judgment about what the political
morality implied by the Constitution is." 61 Judge Frank Johnson possessed
the ability to read the Constitution's mandates independently of his own
personal morality, an attribute that all judges should, but rarely do, possess.
As the Judge put the matter, "Adjudication of constitutional issues requires
an openness of mind and a willingness to decide the issues solely on the
56. Cf Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 21-26 (Ga. 1998) (holding Georgia's anti-sodomy
statute unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996). But cf id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Coloradans are, as I say, entitled to be hostile
toward homosexual conduct.").
57. Johnson, supra note 4, at 468.
58. Id.
59. Johnson, supra note 36, at 908.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 909.
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particular facts and circumstances involved, not with any preconceived
notion or philosophy regarding the outcome of the case." 62 Bowers in many
ways provides a clear example of Judge Johnson following this mode of
judicial analysis.
These cases all reflect Judge Johnson's belief that a federal judge has a
responsibility to do substantial justice in the cases coming before him; for
him, the judicial task required more than the mechanical application of
precedent to facts. Sound judging must reflect three distinct virtues: reason,
courage, and integrity. Reason implied an obligation to use the tools of a
jurist's trade when deciding cases; courage meant "not physical bravery,
but the moral courage to do what is right in the face of certain unpopularity
and public criticism" ;63 and "integrity" referred not merely to honesty or
good ethics, but rather implied "a passion for justice informed by a deep
and abiding compassion that propels the judge toward not only the logical
conclusion-but also the just conclusion." ' Further developing his concept
of judicial integrity, Judge Johnson explained that "[a] judge must always
be consumed by a passion for justice which propels judgment toward the
just conclusion." '
Judge Johnson's judicial legacy is a substantial, indeed enormous,
contribution to the project of creating a truly just and democratic society.
An essential element of any such polity must be the recognition and
implementation of the equal dignity of all persons under law; to state the
proposition a bit differently, a just and democratic society guarantees to all
its citizens equal justice under law.
I remember once riding with the Judge to Atlanta for a sitting of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Having determined that
none of the clerks possessed the good sense to purchase a safe and reliable
car,' he had barred us from driving him to Atlanta, preferring to drive
himself. We were about thirty miles from Montgomery, between
Montgomery and Auburn, Alabama. The Judge gestured at a grove of pecan
trees and informed us that this land once formed part of a large plantation-
a large plantation "worked by human slaves." He said nothing more to us,
nor did he need to. The silence in the car following the Judge's history
lesson was electric; each of the clerks knew that in describing the land's
history, the Judge had rejected and condemned it as inconsistent with the
62. Johnson, supra note 4, at 468-69.
63. Johnson, supra note 3, at 966.
64. lId at 966-69 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id at970.
66. I owned and drove a 1982 Chevrolet Corvette, which, in the Judge's estimation, reflected
poor judgment on my part. I once drove him to the Montgomery airport, a trip during which he
again expressed considerable skepticism about my choice of transportation. My co-clerks drove
Honda Civics. In Judge Johnson's view, none of us had had the good sense to purchase a Lincoln
Town Car.
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land's future. As the Judge put the matter in another context, "[IIf the life
of the law has been experience, then the law should be realistic enough to
treat certain issues as special, as racism is special in American history. A
judiciary that cannot declare that is of little value." 67
It is difficult to reflect on my clerkship with Judge Johnson without
experiencing a great deal of emotion. Working for such a remarkable jurist
was a profoundly humbling experience. He was not only a hero of the law;
he was also a kind and decent man, possessed of an empathy and concern
for his extended judicial family that is difficult to describe in a fashion that
would do him justice.68 When I went to work each day during the clerkship
year, I knew that I was part of an important project: making the
Constitution a lived reality rather than an empty promise. Given my
Southern roots, clerking for Judge Johnson was not merely an opportunity
to advance some abstract ideological commitment, but also an opportunity
to advance the continuing moral evolution of my community. For someone
like me who grew up in a society still working to overcome a legacy of
racism, Judge Johnson represented a kind of moral compass, a hero who
demonstrated quite concretely how one person could make a tremendous
difference to the community. I have not had, and will never have, a better
professional opportunity. Moreover, I will never have a better mentor or
friend.
It is easy to be on the right side of history after history has rendered its
verdict. It is a great deal more difficult to be on the right side of history
when the need to do so is not terribly obvious to one's peers or to the
community in which one lives. Judge Johnson kept a quotation from
President Abraham Lincoln on his desk. It read as follows:
I do the very best I know how-the very best I can; and I mean to
keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what
is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me
67. Johnson, supra note 36, at 908.
68. One anecdote helps to convey the Judge's concern for and commitment to his law clerks.
Mabelle Drake, the wife of one of my co-clerks, is a member of the Navajo tribe and has degrees
in education from Ivy League schools. She sought employment with a state agency charged with
assisting Native Americans; incident to her interview with one administrator, she was subjected to
openly racist remarks and asked to perform "her song and dance" for the entertainment and
amusement of the agency's employees. Judge Johnson asked my co-clerk, John Hueston, how his
wife's job hunt was going, and he told the Judge about the incident. The Judge indicated that the
incident was unfortunate, but said nothing else to John. Later in the week, an official with the
Alabama State Department of Education called Mabelle and offered to assist her in finding a
suitable job, explaining that she came very highly recommended. It turned out that Judge Johnson
was a friend of this gentleman and had called him after learning of Mabelle's plight. The Judge
never said anything about this to my co-clerk. This sort of unexpected kindness was commonplace
with the Judge.
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out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no
difference.69
With the verdict of history now made obvious to all, the end unquestionably
has brought Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. "out all right."
Judge Johnson's judicial legacy has significantly advanced the cause of
justice in both his native South and in the larger national community. Of
course, the effort to achieve equality, to realize fully the ideal set forth in
the Declaration of Independence, remains an ongoing project. Until women,
racial minorities, and sexual minorities routinely enjoy access to positions
of power and authority within communities large and small across the
United States, within both the private and the public sectors of the
community, we cannot deem the battle over and the campaign successful.
As Judge Johnson once put the matter, "Sometimes, I think we've come a
long way on race, and sometimes I just don't know."70
At a time when so many feel a profound disenchantment with public
service, Judge Johnson's life and career demonstrate quite convincingly
how a single person can make a tremendous difference to his community,
his state, and the nation. Moreover, his unwavering commitment to securing
equal justice for all should not be forgotten, nor his quest abandoned, nor
his legacy squandered. Instead, let us hope that Judge Johnson's life and
career will serve as an inspiration to others who follow in his example,
working daily to secure equal justice under law.
69. F.B. CARPENTER, Six MoNTHS AT THE Wl-IrE HOUSE WniH UNCOLN 54 (John Crosby
Freeman ed., Century House 1961) (1866) (quoting President Uncoln).
70. BASS, supra note 14, at 470.
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